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Introduction
IF THE DECADE-OLD crowdfunding industry is still perceived to be
in its infancy, crowd litigation funding (CLF) is simply nascent. The
possibility of relying on small donations, given—mostly online—by
hundreds of individuals who are unrelated to each other, to help de-
fray the potentially high costs of litigation appears to be a welcomed
idea. Unlike the vast division existing between proponents and detrac-
tors of the alternative litigation finance (ALF) industry,1 and the po-
tentially pernicious effects of and the apprehension generated by the
ability of a financier extraneous to the litigation to intrude in the par-
ties’ dealings and assert control over the litigation,2 CLF has flown
under the radar and has not elicited any meaningful controversy to
this day.
In the case of crowdfunding, the financial backer of the litigation
is potentially hundreds of individuals unrelated to each other; most of
these individuals donate small amounts of money instead of “invest-
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especially Elif Sonmez for her superb organizational skills, and the participants in the
alternative litigation finance panel, especially Professor Maya Steinitz and Inder Comar for
their insightful and thought provoking comments. Thanks are also in order to the
practitioners and industry experts that agreed to share their knowledge and experience
about crowdfunding, and explain the ins and outs of this fascinating albeit relatively
unknown industry. Last, but certainly not least, the author would like to express his
appreciation to Alexander Guney and Jacqueline Forni for their incredible support and
diligent editorial work on this Article.
1. See generally infra Part II.
2. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1268, 1299 (2011).
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ing” a large sum toward the litigation.3 As a result, the procurement of
financial support through crowdfunding might, in principle, diminish
or mitigate some of the major concerns about funder control and con-
flicts of interest. Crowdfunding benefactors are not necessarily driven
by a financial gain, but instead by an altruistic motivation or by the
funder’s empathy4 towards a particular cause or project. Even when
the party seeking funding offers a reward in exchange for a monetary
contribution, such reward is usually negligible and does not give the
funder any control administratively, or otherwise, on the fate of the
project.5
This Article describes the blossoming CLF sector by placing it in
the context of the fast-growing crowdfunding industry and the alterna-
tive litigation finance industry. Part I first explains the basic structure,
variations in the types of crowdfunding financing, and the overall im-
pact of crowdfunding, after which this Article turns to highlight the
most important issues that arise in the context of alternative litigation
finance in Part II. Subsequently, in Part III, the Article explains the
main features of the emerging CLF sub-industry and examines the
universe of recently launched crowdfunding campaigns geared to-
wards seeking funding for litigated cases. This Part—and the Article—
ends with a brief discussion on the possible challenges that affect the
development of CLF, and how the sub-industry’s players are address-
ing them.
I. Leave It to the Crowd: Venture Financing in the Web 2.0
Era
Until a few years ago, if an emerging musician wanted to produce
an album or a young inventor wanted to build a prototype or launch a
new product, they most likely had to pitch their idea or project to a
professional producer, a financial institution, or perhaps a wealthy in-
dividual. Depending on many variables and a likely complicated
screening process, the project would perhaps obtain the necessary
funding to come to fruition. Although it is impossible to know how
3. Crowdfunding Puts Access to Justice in the Hands of the People, BENTHAM IMF
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/
2014/02/26/crowdfunding-puts-access-to-justice-in-the-hands-of-the-people.
4. See Richard Painter, Litigation Financing and the Securities Laws, A MODEL LITI-
GATION FINANCE CONTRACT (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.litigationfinancecontract.com/liti-
gation-financing-and-the-securities-laws/.
5. Chance Barnett, Donation-Based Crowdfunding Sites: Kickstarter Vs. Indiegogo, FORBES
(Sept. 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/09/dona
tion-based-crowdfunding-sites-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/.
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many proposals for new ideas or products are successfully supported
in a given year, one can assume that in many cases the process is tax-
ing and the yield is low. In the music industry, for example, the deci-
sion of which artists were allowed to record an album remained
almost always in the hands of a small and select group of people.6
Historically, many social causes and philanthropic initiatives also
faced similar hurdles in their quest to entice wealthy foundations and
other deep-pocketed backers to support their projects and initiatives.7
New ideas and projects also rely on the support of the general public,
but generally only after a well-orchestrated fundraising campaign.8
Churches and other faith-based organizations are among the most vis-
ible and successful fundraisers mostly because of their longstanding
reputation and broad base of followers and affiliates that share their
objectives and support them permanently.9
A. Artistshare and the Modern Roots of Crowdfunding
In 2003, Brian Camelio, a Boston-based musician, launched a
web-based fundraising platform called ArtistShare.10 The main pur-
pose of ArtistShare was to connect artists needing financial support
with fans interested in backing the artists’ projects. In return for a
financial pledge, supporting fans could receive certain benefits, such
as participating in the creative process, attending recording sessions
or special events with the artists, or appearing in the credit listing on
the final product.11 In other cases, the reward consisted of limited
edition or autographed products, VIP tickets to attend concerts, ex-
hibits and other events hosted by the artist, and other items of limited
monetary value depending on the amount pledged by the backer.12 In
6. Andrea Ordanini et al., Crowd-funding: Transforming Customers into Investors Through
Innovative Service Platforms, 22 J. SERV. MGMT. 433, 456 (2011).
7. See Tom Watson, Challenging the Big Funders, FORBES (July 20, 2014, 9:32 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomwatson/2014/07/20/challenging-the-big-funders-philan
thropy-startup-targets-billionaires-and-their-giving/.
8. See ANDREA KIHLSTEDT, CAPITAL CAMPAIGNS: STRATEGIES THAT WORK 157 (2d ed.
2005) (“[The campaign kickoff] is often a media event designed to interest the press in a
story about the capital campaign and the project it is to fund. This event is designed to
obtain media coverage in the broader community just before the solicitors begin to make
their calls.”).
9. See Darryl B. Holloman et al., Motivations for Philanthropic Giving in the African Amer-
ican Church: Implications for Black College Fundraising, 12 J. RES. ON CHRISTIAN EDUC. 137,
137–40 (2009).
10. ARTISTSHARE, http://www.artist share .com (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
11. Featured Projects, ARTISTSHARE, http://www.artistshare.com/v4/Features (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2015).
12. Id.
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order to recognize the efforts of the different backers, the artists and/
or entrepreneurs seeking funding created different tiers of rewards.
Because the artist received public financial support for his or her pro-
ject, ArtistShare billed itself as a “fan-funding platform.”13 Later on,
this model became known as “crowdfunding,” an allusion to the fact
that the financial backing for the project comes from many individu-
als (i.e., a crowd) as opposed to a single sponsor or financier.14 Artist-
Share’s first project was a jazz album proposed by musician Maria
Schneider.15 After running a very successful campaign, Schneider
raised $130,000, which allowed her to “compose the music, pay her
musicians, rent a large recording studio, and produce and market the
album.”16 In 2005, Schneider’s album was recognized with a Grammy
Award, an accolade also earned by several other ArtistShare-funded
projects.17
Essentially, crowdfunding involves two parties, the proponent/en-
trepreneur who launches an idea or project that requires outside sup-
port to materialize, and the “crowd of people that decide to financially
support these projects, bearing a risk and expecting a certain pay-
off.”18 In the majority of cases, however, what makes the connection
between the entrepreneur and the backer possible is the presence of
an intermediary organization known as a crowdfunding platform
(CFP).19 In addition to serving as matchmaker between the benefici-
ary and the funders, CFPs help promote and publicize the projects
and ventures in order to attract the largest possible number of poten-
tial backers.20 To this end, most CFPs have built and maintained a web
presence and operate almost exclusively online, thus taking advantage
13. Id.
14. Ordanini et al., supra note 6, at 444.
15. ArtistShare Celebrates Its 10-Year Anniversary!, ARTISTSHARE (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.artistshare.com/v4/Home/News/1310/ArtistShare-Celebrates-its-10-year-An
niversary-.
16. David Freedman & Matthew R. Nutting, A Brief History of Crowdfunding 1 (Oct.
3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17. See About Us, ARTISTSHARE, http://www.artistshare.com/v4/Home/About (last
visited Mar. 17, 2015) (listing all of the accolades and awards obtained by ArtistShare
funded projects to this day).
18. Justyna Bakker-Rakowska, Crowdfunding for Innovation: A Qualitative Research
on Resources, Capabilities and Stakes 8 (2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Twente), available at http://essay.utwente.nl/64668/1/Bakker-Rakowska_MA_Faculty%20
of%20Management%20and%20Governance.pdf.
19. Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding 15 (Fraunhofer Institute for Systems
and Innovation Research ISI, Working Paper No. R2, 2011), available at https://www.econ
stor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/52302/1/671522264.pdf.
20. Id. at 10–11.
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of the technological innovations of the Web 2.0, which enables people
to “use, create and modify content and interact with other users
through social networks.”21
The possibility of reaching out to potential backers and matching
them with entrepreneurs through the Internet has been a panacea to
CFPs and to fundraisers, in general. According to recent industry re-
ports, online giving has been growing steadily in the United States
during the last few years.22 In the case of charitable giving, the up-
surge has been even more stunning. In 2013, for example, online giv-
ing grew almost three times more than all forms of charitable giving
together.23 Some industry experts predict that online giving will con-
tinue to be a growth engine for nonprofit organizations in the foresee-
able future,24 and the crowdfunding industry will undoubtedly benefit
from that trend.
ArtistShare was not alone in relying on the crowdfunding model
successfully; in the late nineties, for example, some other crowdfund-
ing initiatives were launched to support music-related projects.25 As
the crowdfunding industry expanded, CFPs began competing with
each other to entice entrepreneurs, creators, and developers into pro-
posing projects, and helping them connect with people willing to fi-
nance their ventures.26 In addition to playing the role of matchmaker,
CFPs also perform certain administrative and fiduciary roles by estab-
lishing and implementing procedures to handle the reception, admin-
istration, and disbursement of any monies received from the
backers.27 Cognizant of the risks associated with online transactions in
an increasingly complex virtual marketplace—and the perceived need
to build a trustworthy environment for their users—CFPs began devis-
ing and implementing comprehensive selection processes for the
21. Ordanini et al., supra note 6, at 445.
22. STEVE MACLAUGHLIN, BLACKBAUD IDEA LAB, CHARITABLE GIVING REPORT: HOW
NONPROFIT FUNDRAISING PERFORMED IN 2013 1 (Feb. 2014), available at https://www.black
baud.com/files/resources/downloads/2014/2013.CharitableGivingReport.pdf.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Although the Schneider campaign is often credited as the first successful
crowdfunded campaign in the United States, as early as 1997, the rock band Marillion
raised over £35,000 from a group of fans through the Internet to finance its first American
tour. See Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 427,
437 (2014).
26. See Douglas J. Cumming et al., Crowdfunding Models: Keep-It-All vs. All-or-Noth-
ing 5–7 (Sept. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447567.
27. Id. at 5.
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projects that they agreed to sponsor and also made efforts to ensure
transparency throughout the funding campaigns.28
In exchange for their involvement, CFPs routinely take a percent-
age of the proceeds (a success fee), which varies from four to nine
percent of the raised capital, depending on the model in which the
crowdfunding campaign is based.29 To this end, entrepreneurs usually
set a capital-raising goal to give the crowd a sense of their aspirations,
to help others assess the feasibility of the project and the level of risk
assumed by the potential investors, and to set the parameters for cal-
culating the rewards offered to them and the compensation to be ob-
tained by the CFP.30 The funders’ level of risk also varies depending
on whether the entrepreneur has adopted a “Keep-it-All” (KIA) or an
“All-or-Nothing” (AON) model.31 The difference is that in crowdfund-
ing campaigns that run under the KIA model, the entrepreneur has
the right to keep the entire amount pledged regardless of whether the
preset capital goal has been reached.32 Conversely, in the AON
model, the entrepreneur will only receive the pledged funds if and
when the capital goal is reached, thus significantly reducing the
“crowd’s risk that undercapitalized projects will be undertaken.”33
Whereas some CFPs only participate in certain industries or
niche areas such as music and arts (ArtistShare, Bandstocks,34 Sella-
band,35 and Slicethepie36), scientific research (Experiment37 and Petrid-
ish.org38), or fashion design (Beforethelabel.com,39 Betabrand.com,40
Cameesa.com,41 Iamlamode.com,42 and Outofx.com43), the most
28. FLORIAN DANMAYR, Web 2.0 and Crowdfunding Platforms, in ARCHETYPES OF
CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS 7 (2014).
29. Cumming et al., supra note 26, at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6–8.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 3.
34. BANDSTOCKS.COM, http://www.kwamecorp.com/lifestream/2008/09/bandstock-
scom.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
35. SELLABAND, https://www.sellaband.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
36. SLICETHEPIE, http://www.slicethepie.com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
37. EXPERIMENT, https://www.experiment.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
38. PETRIDISH.ORG, http://www.petridish.org/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
39. BEFORE THE LABEL, http://beforethelabel.com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
40. BETABRAND, http://www.betabrand.com/think-tank/crowdfunding.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2015).
41. Crowdfunding Fashion, CAMEESA.COM, http://cameesa.weebly.com/cameesa-t-
shirts.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
42. I AM LA MODE, http://www.iamlamode.com/en (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
43. OUT OF X, https://www.outofx.com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
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prominent CFPs include Kickstarter44 and Indiegogo.45 Indiegogo
specifically “offers entrepreneurs the possibility to launch their online
reward-based crowdfunding campaign in three categories (Innovative,
Creative, or Social), which are divided in 24 subcategories.”46 The
spectrum of projects sponsored by these CFPs range from consumer
products to movies to social causes, and even to litigation.47
B. The Global Reach and Versatility of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is certainly a global phenomenon, and the fact
that most crowdfunding campaigns take place online helps the indus-
try remain unaffected by any geographical limitations. CFPs, such as
Indiegogo, offer their website in several languages and allow
crowdfunding campaigns to be launched in different currencies.48
Pledges are collected through online payment systems such as PayPal,
which is available in more than two hundred countries, and accepts
twenty-six different currencies.49 Despite the centrality of online plat-
forms in the development of the crowdfunding industry, the defining
feature of crowdfunding is not the means through which the funds
are generally raised (i.e., online), but the fact that the financing
originates from a large number of people (i.e., a crowd) who are geo-
graphically dispersed,50 and whose contribution—at least in the case
of reward-based crowdfunding campaigns—is usually tied to obtaining
something in exchange, ranging from intangible benefits to a material
payoff.51
Crowdfunding may also serve as a vehicle to raise equity for a
business venture (equity crowdfunding), to facilitate lending (lending
crowdfunding), or simply to obtain philanthropic or charitable contri-
butions without offering anything in exchange to the funders (dona-
44. KICKSTARTER, https://kickstarter.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
45. INDIEGOGO, https://indiegogo.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
46. See Cumming et al., supra note 26, at 5.
47. See, e.g., Kelly Cheung, Considering Crowdfunding as a Litigation Aid? You Should,
FINDLAW (May 29, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/in_house/2013/05/consid
ered-crowdfunding-a-business-litigation-strategy-you-should.html. See infra Part III.C.
48. Start Your Campaign, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/campaigns/new
(last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
49. PayPal Global, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/country-world
wide (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
50. Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, The Geography of Crowdfunding 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, Feb. 2011), available at http:/
/www.nber.org/papers/w16820.pdf.
51. Hemer, supra note 19, at 13.
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tion crowdfunding).52 Some CFPs operate outside the web by
matching entrepreneurs and donors face-to-face and are mainly de-
voted to sponsor donation-based campaigns,53 while others follow in-
stead the equity crowdfunding model.54
Despite its globalizing features, 94 percent of the crowdfunding
industry is concentrated between North America (59 percent) and Eu-
rope (35 percent),55 which is also where most CFPs are based.56 Un-
surprisingly, it is also in these jurisdictions where the policy debate on
crowdfunding is more active, and where the industry has been subject
to official regulation.57 Some examples stemming from the United
States are the Jump Start Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),58 the
Regulation Crowdfunding proposed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,59 as well as the recent statutes governing
52. Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 181 (2014).
53. A good example is SOUP, a Detroit-based organization, which organizes a
monthly potluck dinner during which a crowd of potential funders contributes with five
dollars each and listens to four four-minute proposals of projects that benefit the commu-
nity. At the end of the night, the crowd votes for the best proposal, which is then awarded
all of the money raised in the evening, and the drafters of the proposal are invited back to
a later event to give a report. See DETROIT SOUP, http://detroitsoup.com/howitworks/
(last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
54. One example of an offline CFP that promotes equity crowdfunding campaigns is
the Florida-based platform called One Spark, which connects creators and funders at a
weeklong event held at a multi-venue gallery in downtown Jacksonville, during which peo-
ple pitch their proposals to a crowd of potential funders. See About, ONE SPARK, https://
www.onespark.com/about (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
55. Crowdfunding Statistics and Trends, GOGETFUNDING, http://blog.gogetfunding.com
/crowdfunding-statistics-and-trends-infographic/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
56. See Directory of Sites, CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/direc
tory (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
57. See generally Weinstein, supra note 25 (describing the regulation of equity
crowdfunding in the United Kingdom, Italy, and France); Daniela Castrataro & Ivana Pais,
Analisi delle Piattaforme di Crowdfunding Italiane [Analysis of Italian Crowdfunding Plat-
forms] (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the devel-
opment of crowdfunding in Italy).
58. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). It
is important to note, however, that the JOBS Act only refers to “investment crowd fund-
ing,” a modality of micro-lending or benevolent giving to individuals or specific causes
through CFPs. See Weinstein, supra note 25, at 427–28 (discussing investment crowdfund-
ing in the context of the JOBS Act).
59. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
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investment crowdfunding in Georgia,60 Kansas,61 Michigan,62 Ala-
bama,63 and Maine.64
As mentioned earlier, crowdfunding campaigns can help materi-
alize a broad range of projects and serve an array of different interests,
from commercial to purely philanthropic. A group of people collect-
ing and giving small amounts of money is not a new phenomenon; the
practice has a long history in the realm of charity and social coopera-
tion.65 People have traditionally given money and offered support to
causes that promote the welfare of others and the advancement of
altruistic goals.66 Examples include the preservation of endangered
species, the advancement of certain individual and collective rights,
the pursuit of social causes, and even the preservation of religious tra-
ditions. Philanthropic giving is generally driven by altruistic motiva-
tions, including “self-esteem, public recognition, satisfaction of
expressing gratitude for one’s own wellbeing, and relief from feelings
of guilt and obligation,”67 or even the expectation of potentially bene-
fitting from the supported activity.68 Similar motivations can be found
in the support for social and humanitarian causes, and in the pursuit
of legal strategies to advance such goals.69
This is particularly important in the realm of public interest litiga-
tion, where support and funding tend to be limited, and are usually
conditioned on the charitable time contribution of lawyers, activists,
60. Bill Meagher, States Make Own Crowdfunding Rules, Rather Than Wait for SEC, THE
DEAL PIPELINE (May 5, 2014), http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/states-make-
own-crowdfunding-rules-rather-than-wait-for-sec.php. See Invest Georgia Exemption, GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2013).
61. Invest Kansas Exemption—“IKE,” OFF. KAN. SEC. COMM’R, http://www.ksc.ks.gov/
DocumentCenter/View/228 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21
(2011).
62. Alan McGlade, Michigan Governor Signs Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption, FORBES
(Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcglade/2013/12/31/michigan-gover
nor-signs-intrastate-crowdfunding-exemption/.
63. S. 44, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2014).
64. Meagher, supra note 60.
65. Ordanini et al., supra note 6, at 445.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 447.
68. James Andreoni, Philanthropy, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRU-
ISM AND RECIPROCITY 1201, 1204 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds.,
2006).
69. VELINA STOIANOVA, GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PRIVATE FUNDING: AN
EMERGING TREND IN HUMANITARIAN GIVING 2–10 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.global
humanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Private-funding-an-emerging-
trend.pdf.
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and other supporters.70 Part II will discuss how the advent of third-
party funding into the litigation world potentially creates new pos-
sibilities for litigants, yet also poses important challenges that
crowdfunding might be able to address, as subsequently described in
Part III.
II. The Not-So-New Thing: The Rising Popularity of
Alternative Litigation Financing
Alternative litigation financing (ALF)71 has garnered significant
attention during the last few years.72 A number of academic publica-
tions,73 industry reports,74 and specialized conferences75 on this topic
reveal an increased interest in this emerging sector. The policy de-
bate, however, has been circumscribed to a handful of jurisdictions—
namely the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom.76 In
these countries, alternative financing has been addressed by legisla-
tion,77 considered by domestic courts,78 and increasingly promoted by
70. Erik S. Knutsen & Janet Walker, Canada, in THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 239, 250 (Christopher Hodges et al. eds., 2010).
71. Other names for ALF include third-party funding, claims transfer, outside invest-
ment, and litigation finance. See Heather A. Miller, Don’t Just Check “Yes” or “No”: The Need
for Broader Consideration of Outside Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 311–12
(2010).
72. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FI-
NANCING IN THE UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_
papers/OP306.html (2010).
73. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 2; Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 62 (2011).
74. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING
LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1–4
(Oct. 2009); FRESHFIELDS BRUCHAUS DERINGER, CLASS ACTIONS AND THIRD PARTY FUNDING
OF LITIGATION 1–3 (June 2007); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011) (discussing
third party litigation financing).
75. See, e.g., Conference on Third Party Funding of International Arbitrations, held by
CICIA (Feb. 7, 2014); Global Conference on Third-Party Financing of Litigation, held by
SCJI (Nov. 9–10, 2011); Conference on Third Party Litigation Funding and Claim Trans-
fer, held by the UCLA-RAND Center for Law & Public Policy (2010).
76. In those jurisdictions, the issue of alternative financing in litigation is part of a
broader debate on outside investment on the provision of legal services and different di-
rect ownership models in law firms. See Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regu-
lation-Responding to a Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 518–22
(2009); Miller, supra note 71, at 313.
77. Miller, supra note 71, at 327.
78. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460 n.6
(2012).
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investment funds and financial institutions.79 In Australia, the litiga-
tion-funding industry has been subject to regulatory action, under the
Corporations Amendment Regulation,80 as a way to mitigate the ten-
sions that arise in the realm of control and the realm of conflicts of
interest. In Europe, the Recommendation on Common Principles for
Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the
Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under
Union Law issued by the European Commission in 2013 requires
plaintiffs to declare the source of their funding.81
The emerging ALF industry is comprised of two different sectors:
one devoted to consumer funding that focuses on “small personal
claims, predominantly personal injury and divorce cases”;82 and the
other one that refers to business dispute funding, which is usually
large-scale and complex, and involves sophisticated parties.83 Substan-
tively, the discussion on ALF centers on its impact on domestic litiga-
tion, and whether it should be left to the fate of market forces,
regulated, or banned altogether.84 Experts and commentators refer to
the increasing relevance of alternative financing in international liti-
gation85 and arbitration.86 After all, several important developments
affecting litigation have percolated to the realm of arbitration, to the
point that some have begun referring to arbitration as the “new
litigation.”87
Regulation on the assignment of legal claims and restrictions im-
posed on the involvement of third parties in litigation have tradition-
ally been circumscribed to parties and disputes subject to the
territorial boundaries of municipal laws and the jurisdiction of domes-
79. William Alden, Litigation Finance Firm Raises $260 Million for New Fund, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/litigation-finance-firm-raises-
260-million-for-new-fund/?_r=0.
80. Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 6) (Austl.).
81. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for In-
junctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concern-
ing Violations of Rights Granted under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (C 3539) 1, available at http:/
/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOL_2013_201_R_NS0013.
82. Steinitz, supra note 78, at 460.
83. Id. at 460–61.
84. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 1–7.
85. Miller, supra note 71, at 358–60.
86. Maxi Scherer, Aren Goldsmith & Camille Flechet, Third Party Funding in Interna-
tional Arbitration in Europe, 2012 INT’L BUS. L.J. 207, 207 (2012); Willem H. van Boom,
Third Party Financing International Investment Arbitration 9 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
87. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
8–9 (2010).
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tic courts.88 In more concrete terms, the discussion centers on
whether and to what extent third parties should be allowed to inter-
vene or be barred from intermeddling in extraneous litigation.89 An-
other source of concern relates to the implications that alternative
financing might have vis-a´-vis local ethical rules, and whether alterna-
tive financing should be encouraged, regulated, or left to the fate of
market forces and the individual decisions of sophisticated litigants.90
The increased commodification of lawsuits, and their portrayal as ei-
ther assets or liabilities has also played a role in giving more promi-
nence to issues involving alternative financing.91
A critical part of this debate involves a discussion about the legal
rules on maintenance92 and its most common species known as cham-
perty,93 the two most prominent limitations to alternative litigation
financing practices in the common law world.94 Maintenance and
champerty95 have been addressed in different ways by national laws,
courts, and local bar associations,96 and have been the subject of
88. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 73, at 99–120.
89. See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A
Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J.
COMP. L. 93, 100–06 (2013).
90. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance
Should be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 70–77 (2004).
91. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 72–73 (2010).
92. Maintenance is “ ‘the intermeddling in a suit by a stranger, one having no privity
or concern in the subject matter and standing in no relation of duty to the suitor.’” Hall v.
State, 655 A.2d 827, 829 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (quoting 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty and
Maintenance § 2 (1964)). See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the
House of Delegates, at 9–12 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_
hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
93. Hamilton v. Gray, 31 A. 315, 315 (Vt. 1895) (“Champerty is an agreement between
the owner of a claim and a volunteer that the latter may take the claim and collect it,
dividing the proceeds with the owner, if they prevail; the champertor to carry on the suit at
his own expense.”).
94. Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 593, 594 (2012); Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of
Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 655 (2005).
95. See Hamilton, 31 A. at 315.
96. Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1297, 1302–06 (2002); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2
(2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/
1159-formal-opinion-2011-02; ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the
House of Delegates, at 9–12; L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Responsibility and Ethics Comm’n,
Formal Op. 500 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm
?pageid=433.
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scholarly debate for decades,97 thus revealing that the concern about
third-party funding is an old phenomenon. What seems to be new,
however, are the commoditization of legal claims, the increasingly
complex litigation funding arrangements, and the emergence of a
professional industry of litigation financiers.98 As a signal of this trend,
some jurisdictions, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, have
progressively moved toward lowering the bar and removing some of
the obstacles traditionally imposed on maintenance, and conversely
encouraging ALF to occur.99 In turn, this has enabled the nascent in-
dustry of litigation financing to flourish, along with the emergence of
some publicly traded companies as its most prominent players.100
Proponents of ALF argue that that alternative financing may be a
positive force because of its potential for opening the doors to groups
of individual litigants or small business parties otherwise lacking the
resources and expertise to pursue their claims through litigation.101
Moreover, the availability of alternative financing may also help level
the playing field102 by altering the bargaining dynamics of the par-
ties,103 which, in turn, might help promote access to justice.104 On the
other hand, some critics argue that the increased involvement of pro-
fessional investors in the litigation finance industry could produce
some pernicious effects. These effects may include the encourage-
ment of meritless claims and settlement agreements that are detri-
97. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 66–69
(1935) (describing the origins of champerty and its historical evolution); Percy Winfield,
The History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 LITIG. Q. REV. 50 (1919) (discussing the histori-
cal origins of maintenance and champerty).
98. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1318–22; Steinitz, supra note 78, at 455–56.
99. Michael Legg et al., The Rise and Regulation of Litigation Funding in Australia, 38 N.
KY. L. REV. 625, 627 (2011); Miller, supra note 71, at 326–33.
100. Second-hand Suits, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21575805-fat-returns-those-who-help-companies-take-legal-action-
second-hand-suits.
101. GEOFFREY MCGOVERN ET AL., UCLA-RAND CENTER FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY,
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER 1 (2010), available at http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf.
102. Id. at 4. See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That
Has a Place in The United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 102 (2008). See also BRIEFCASE
ANALYTICS & BURFORD CAPITAL LLC, SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION FINANCING SURVEY 10
(2013), available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2013-
SURVEY-REPORT-FINAL-2014-01-14.pdf.
103. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1303–18.
104. See Gulf Azov Shipping Co. Ltd. v Idisi, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 292, [54]. (“Public
policy now recognises that it is desirable, in order to facilitate access to justice, that third
parties should provide assistance designed to ensure that those who are involved in litiga-
tion have the benefit of legal representation.”).
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mental to the client—but not necessarily to the funder—or  the
undue influence and interference of the funder in the relationship
between the client and her counsel.105
Other issues arising in the ALF discussion regard the disclosure
about the existence of the funding transaction, the identity of the
funder, and even the content and scope of the litigation funding
agreement.106 There may be several reasons for disclosing the funding
transaction and related aspects. One of them is the need to identify
possible conflicts of interest, which might exist between the funder
and one of the parties to the litigation.107 Disclosure might also facili-
tate the monitoring of the funder’s conduct with regard to how much
control the funder has over the litigation and the funded party.108
Both conflicts of interest and control have obvious ethical implica-
tions for the parties. This prompted some jurisdictions to press for
regulation and encouraged the courts to decide whether to order dis-
closure and to what extent.109
Regarding the latter, there are examples of cases from Australia
and New Zealand where courts ordered the funded party to produce a
litigation financing agreement. In one such case, Saunders v. Hough-
ton,110 a class action case, the New Zealand court required the plaintiff
in the class action suit to produce the financing agreement to the
court, but not to opposing counsel.111 The court then scrutinized the
quality and conduct of the litigation funders, the independence of the
lawyer, and the relationship between the funder and the acting law-
yer.112 Australian courts, in turn, require the litigation funding agree-
ment to be disclosed to the other party, but allow the funded party to
redact it in order to avoid giving tactical advantage to the
opponent.113
105. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN
AUSTRALIA 12–14 (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
uploads/sites/1/TPLF_in_Australia_page_web.pdf.
106. Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd. [2013] 1 NZLR 91, 91 (SC).
107. Jennifer A. Trusz, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest Arising from Third-Party Funding
in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 GEO. L.J. 1648, 1657 (2013).
108. Id. at 1655.
109. See, e.g., Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd. [2013] 1 NZLR 91, 91 (SC).
110. Saunders v Houghton [2012] 2 NZLR 652 (CA).
111. Id. at 653.
112. Id. at 652.
113. Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 17, at 3.6 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/law-and-practice/practice-documents/practice-notes/cm17.
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In a more recent case, Waterhouse v. Contractors Bonding, Ltd.,114
the Supreme Court of New Zealand also ordered disclosure and fur-
ther discussed the scope of judicial scrutiny.115 While allowing the
non-funded party to examine the funding agreement, the court re-
dacted it and allowed only certain information for examination, such
as: (1) the litigation funder’s location and identity; (2) the funder’s
financial standing; (3) the funder’s amenability to the New Zealand
courts’ jurisdiction; and (4) the terms for withdrawal of funding and
the consequences of such withdrawal.116
Generally speaking, the push for disclosure seeks to prevent the
funder—usually a single entity or an individual—from exercising un-
due influence on the party or controlling litigation.117 An individual
funder is obviously easy to identify and single out, but this might not
be possible when the funding comes from multiple sources, as is the
case with CLF.118 Part III will describe the nascent CLF sector and will
discuss the potential offered by this novel form of ALF to mitigate
some of the drawbacks commonly associated with the traditional
forms of third-party funding in the realm of litigation.
III. “A Few Bucks for a Good Cause”: Crowd Litigation
Funding (CLF) and Its Potential Benefits and
Challenges
The apprehension generated by the ability of an external finan-
cier to meddle in the litigation and exert control over the funded
party is likely to diminish when the funding comes from multiple indi-
viduals, as in the context of crowdfunding campaigns. Crowdfunding
benefactors are not necessarily driven by a financial gain, but instead
are driven by an altruistic motivation or by the funder’s empathy with
a particular cause or project.119 Even in situations where the party
114. See Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd. [2013] 1 NZLR 91, 91–92 (SC).
115. Id. at 92.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Richard Painter, Crowd Funding, Private Placements and Other Options for Funding
Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Under the JOBS Act of 2012, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Feb. 26, 2013), http://
www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2013/02/crowd-funding-private-placements-and-other-
options-for-funding-plaintiffs-lawsuits-under-the-jobs-ac.html (“[A] process by which a large
number of investors are solicited—for example over the Internet—to contribute modest
amounts of capital that add up to a lot of money . . . .”).
119. See Elizabeth Gerber & Julie Hui, Crowdfunding: Motivations and Deterrents for Partici-
pation, 20 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUM. INTERACTION 34:1, 34:8–34:14 (Dec.
2013), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2530540&CFID=647359794&CF
TOKEN=33849306.
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seeking funding offers rewards in exchange for a monetary contribu-
tion, any such reward usually is minor or inconsequential and does
not provide the funder with any administrative or other type of con-
trol over the outcome of the project.120
Moreover, some CFPs, such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter, pro-
hibit campaign owners from offering “any form of financial incentive
or participation in any profit sharing,”121 equity, repayment, or “secur-
ity,” as perks to the contributors/donors.122 The perks offered to
crowdfunding donors are usually a symbolic token used to entice
them to participate or to show appreciation for supporting the cam-
paign.123 Although crowdfunding perks are generally perceived as
producing a positive effect on donors,124 they are not the main reason
why people support a particular campaign. People tend to donate be-
cause they feel a connection with those seeking support, to be part of
a group, or because they consider the campaign to be aligned with
their personal beliefs. Further, individual crowdfunding donations
tend to be small, to the point that they do not qualify as investments,
and—at least in the United States—are excluded from the regulatory
regime applicable to securities.125 In this sense, crowdfunding contri-
butions are no different from the donations obtained by activists and
advocates to benefit many public interest causes. Whereas the individ-
ual donations might be small in size, it is the aggregation of numerous
contributions that makes a campaign successful.
In the particular case of cause lawyering,126 different types of enti-
ties—ranging from legal aid organizations, to public interest law
firms, to human and civil rights defense organizations—have tradi-
tionally relied on charitable contributions from the public, grants
120. See id. at 14.
121. Terms of Use, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/terms (last visited
Feb. 7, 2015).
122. See Our Rules, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2015).
123. Hemer, supra note 19, at 14.
124. Samantha Hurst, GreedyGiver Launches Perk Marketplace for Crowdfunding Campaigns,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (July 16, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/07/44251-
greedygiver-launches-perk-marketplace-crowdfunding-campaigns/.
125. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S.
Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 64 (2011).
126. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31–33 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998) (defining cause lawyering as legal work undertaken for a particular
cause, goal, or objective).
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from foundations, and sponsorships from corporations to carry out
their activities, particularly litigation.127
Likewise, individual cause lawyers and activists have also relied on
the generosity of benefactors and supporters to achieve socially-
minded goals, while trying to maintain a reasonable level of indepen-
dence. Regarding the latter, one of the biggest challenges faced by
cause lawyers and legal aid organizations alike has been the need to
insulate themselves from external pressures, including preventing
their benefactors from imposing conditions on their actions, or exert-
ing influence which might adversely affect the cause lawyers’ auton-
omy.128 In order to minimize the potential for conflict and other
shortcomings arising from the traditional funding mechanisms, some
have advocated for other forms of financing, such as court awarded
attorney fees,129 strategic philanthropy,130 and more recently,
crowdfunding.
A. CLF in Practice: The Emergence of a New Sub-Industry
The number of cases involving CLF is still scant, but the interest
in this new sub-industry appears to be on the rise. As of March 2015,
there have been only a handful of CLF cases involving traditional
CFPs, but, at the same time, specialized players such as the litigation-
dedicated CFP, Lexshares.com, and the peer-to-peer online network,
Invest4justice (I4J), have also entered this nascent market.131 From
the existing CLF campaigns, at least two different variations of litiga-
tion crowdfunding can be identified: reward-based and donation-
based crowdfunding.132 All CLF campaigns were launched through
online CFPs based in the United States or Canada, such as Indiegogo,
GoFundMe, Fundanything, and CSI Catalyst. Only two campaigns
sought precisely to promote the creation of another CFP devoted ex-
clusively to collect and disburse monies for litigation;133 all other cam-
127. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from The-
ory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 628 (2008).
128. Id. at 620.
129. Peter E. Sitkin & J. Anthony Kline, Financing Public Interest Litigation, 13 ARIZ. L.
REV. 823, 825–27 (1971).
130. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 127, at 628–30.
131. LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Invest4Justice:
The Peer-to-Peer Litigation Crowdfunding Network, INVEST4JUSTICE, http://www.invest4justice
.com/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
132. The Ultimate Crowdfunding Guide, CROWDFUND INSIDER, http://www.crowdfundin
sider.com/the-ultimate-crowdfunding-guide/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
133. Wildcard Nominee—Crowd Funding Legal Action, INNOVATING JUSTICE FORUM, http://
www.innovatingjustice.com/innovations/crowd-funding-legal-action?view_content=details
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paigns were intended to raise contributions to help a private party
offset their litigation costs in a current or forthcoming court case. Ta-
ble 1 below shows the amount of contributions raised, the type of cam-
paign, the goal set in each campaign, and the duration of the
different CLF campaigns launched since 2013.
Table 1. Crowdfunding Litigation Campaigns Launched Since 2013
Contributions
Type of Raised by Launching Date-
Campaign CFP Campaign* Goal Set 03/18/2015 Closing Date
Save Our Podcasts Fundanything.com Reward- N/A $482,607 2/2014-N/A
Legal defense Based
Fund134 CSC
Seattle Officers’ Gofundme.com Donation- $100,000 $3,715 8/30/2014-N/A
Lawsuit135 Based
CSC
Support First US- Indiegogo.com Reward- $6,000 $6,166 4/9/2013-
Iraqi Lawsuit Based 5/24/2013
Against Bush CSC
Administration
About the Iraq
war136
Save Startup, Indiegogo.com Reward- $30,000 $10,243 5/12/2013-
DITTO.com, Based 7/11/2013
from Patent CSC
Trolls137
Day in Court Innovatingjustice Donation- N/A N/A 2013
.com Based
GFC
Getjustaccess.com Csicatalyst.com Donation- N/A N/A 2013
Based
GFC
*(Reward/Donation-Based and Case-Specific Campaign (CSC)/General Funding Campaign (GFC))
In addition to the cases shown above in Table 1, an online press
release published on January 17, 2014 announced an Indiegogo-based
crowdfunding campaign launched by two Miami-based leather goods
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015). See JUSTACCESS, http://www.getjustaccess.com/ (last visited Feb.
7, 2015).
134. Save Our Podcasts Legal Defense Fund, FUNDANYTHING, http://www.fundanything
.com/en/campaigns/patenttroll (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
135. Seattle Officers’ Lawsuit, GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com/bqpdk4 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2015).
136. Support First US-Iraqi Lawsuit Against the Bush Administration About the Iraq War,
INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/support-first-us-iraqi-lawsuit-against-
bush-administration-about-the-iraq-war (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). See Class Action
Complaint for Conspiracy to Commit Aggression; and the Crime of Aggression at 10–14,
Saleh v. Bush, No. C-13-1124 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://
witnessiraq.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SalehBush.pdf.
137. Save Startup, DITTO.com, from Patent Trolls, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo
.com/projects/save-startup-ditto-com-from-patent-trolls (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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designers to help pay attorneys fees in a patent infringement litigation
before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.138 A
search on Indiegogo, however, reveals that the campaign was never
launched.139
The CLF campaigns included in Table 1 could be divided into
two categories. The first category, which I term “case-specific
campaign” (CSC), involves campaigns that seek to raise funds to
support a pre-established litigation.140 The second category, involves
crowdfunding campaigns geared at or toward creating specialized,
litigation-related CFPs designed to receive, administer, and provide
funding to needy litigants.141 I refer to these campaigns as “general
funding campaigns” (GFCs).142
One of the GFCs was donation-based, and the other one reward-
based. Conversely, most CSCs were reward-based; that is, backers were
offered perks in exchange for their donations. These perks were
established on a scale ranging from one dollar to five thousand
dollars, as shown in Table 2 below.
138. Laura Buccellati Seeks Crowd Funding to Defend Her Leather Goods Company in Court,
PRWEB (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.prweb.com/releases/LauraBuccellati/CrowdFunding
/prweb11489935.htm.
139. See Invalid Page, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/p/622604?vsmaid=1
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (indicating that the requested page regarding this campaign is in
“DRAFT” mode and is unavailable to the public).
140. See, e.g., Save Our Podcasts Legal Defense Fund, supra note 134; Save Startup,
DITTO.com, from Patent Trolls, supra note 137; Seattle Officers’ Lawsuit, supra note 135; Support
First US-Iraqi Lawsuit Against the Bush Administration About the Iraq War, supra note 136.
141. See About Us, INNOVATING JUSTICE FORUM, http://www.innovatingjustice.com/
about (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); JUSTACCESS, supra note 133.
142. See, e.g., Wildcard Nominee—Crowd Funding Legal Action, supra note 133;
Crowdfunding for Justice, supra note 141.
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Table 2. Perks Offered in Different Reward-Based, Crowd-
Litigation Funding (CLF) Campaigns
Donation Support First US-Iraqi Lawsuit Save Startup,
Level/ Save Our Podcasts Legal against Bush Administration DITTO.com, from
Perks Offered Defense Fund (SOP) about the Iraq War (ILAB) Patent Trolls (SDSU)
$1 N/A Acknowledgement of support for N/A
campaign
$5 Publicity materials Thank you email from Comar N/A
Law
$10 N/A Handwritten thank you card N/A
$20 All of the above plus four N/A N/A
posters)
$25 N/A Thank you card and decal N/A
$30 All of the above plus a N/A T-shirt in various
#TrollHunter Campaign sizes and colors
T-shirt
$50 All of the above plus a cap with Thank you card, decal, and N/A
campaign logo signed complaint
$75 All of the above plus a igned N/A N/A
imited Edition Certificate of
Enlistment in the “Troll Fighters
Army” on personalized
parchment
$95 All of the above plus surprise N/A N/A
items, including a personalized
letter and digital download
$100 Guest star on  the podcast, “Story All of the above, plus invitation N/A
Worthy” to telephonic Q&A with attorneys
$125 Unlimited access to podcasts N/A N/A
featuring Marc Maron for life
$250 VIP package with comedian Brad All of the above, plus thank you N/A
Williams (2 tickets to any show note from lead Iraqi plaintiffs
and private meet and greet with
comedian)
$500 Be in Studio for a taping of the All of the above, plus one hour N/A
podcast, “About Last Night” of legal time with Comar Law in
any practice area of Comar Law
$2,500 Be in studio for taping of the All of the above, plus dinner with N/A
podcast, “Mohr Stories” Iraqi plaintiffs and their lawyers
$5,000 Private recording studio All of the above, plus recognition N/A
appearance with Adam Carolla on the Witness Iraq website as a
“Chief Supporter” of the Witness
Iraq Legal Defense Fund
Among the CSCs indicated in Table 1, only the “Seattle Officer’s
Lawsuit” CLF campaign was donation-based, in other words, its
promoters did not offer anything in exchange for support and no
funding scale was established.143 However, the campaign webpage
listed the individual donations, most of which were anonymous and
143. See Seattle Officers’ Lawsuit, supra note 135.
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ranged from twenty dollars to two hundred and fifty dollars.144 In
terms of promoting the CSC campaigns, three were launched by the
litigants themselves145 and only the “US-Iraqi Lawsuit” CLF campaign
was launched by the lawyer.146 In all three CSC cases, the justification
for the CLF campaigns was to help defray legal fees and expenses,
although only the promoters of “Save Our Podcasts” and “Save Our
Startup, Ditto.com,” cited the potential high costs of litigation as the
main reason for soliciting donations.147
B. Getting to Give: General Funding Campaigns (GFCs) and the
Advent of New Players in the CLF Sub-Industry
Regarding the GFCs in Table 1, the goal was not to solicit support
for a specific litigation, but instead to create a dedicated platform that
would raise, administer, and disburse money obtained from
crowdfunding donors to needy litigants in order enable them to pur-
sue litigation.148 With both CSCs and GFCs, the promoters appeared
to be individuals or stand-alone entities—although it was not clear
whether they were affiliated or related to a traditional advocacy group,
legal aid society, or public interest lawyer.
The first initiative was led by a group called JustAccess (JA) and
launched through the Canadian CFP, CSI Catalyst.149 In the pro-
moter’s own words, the purpose was to create a CFP that would enable
“both defendants and plaintiffs [to] access financial support for the
legal cases that matter for everyone.”150 Although the campaigns did
not make a distinction between private and public interest cases, one
could assume that they would focus on the latter based on their
descriptions.151
The promoters of the JA campaign set their goal at ten thousand
dollars and provided a five-tier scale for donations ranging between
144. Id.
145. See Save Our Podcasts Legal Defense Fund, supra note 134; Save Startup, DITTO.com,
from Patent Trolls, supra note 137; Seattle Officers’ Lawsuit, supra note 135.
146. See Support First US-Iraqi Lawsuit Against the Bush Administration About the Iraq War,
supra note 136.
147. See Save Our Podcasts Legal Defense Fund, supra note 134; Save Startup, DITTO.com,
from Patent Trolls, supra note 137.
148. Wildcard Nominee—Crowd Funding Legal Action, supra note 133; Crowdfunding for Jus-
tice, supra note 141.
149. JustAccess (Campaign Cancelled), CSI CATALYST, http://www.csicatalyst.org/
projects/28-justaccess (last visited Jan. 21 2015); About Us, CSI CATALYST, http://
www.csicatalyst.org/pages/about-us (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
150. JustAccess (Campaign Cancelled), supra note 149.
151. See id.
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ten dollars and one hundred and fifty dollars.152 Although the JA cam-
paign was able to attract at least ten backers and a total of six hundred
and fifty dollars, the project was cancelled.153 The project funders
posted a comment on the campaign page indicating that they “just
found another, hopefully more effective,” way to increase access to
justice, but did not offer any specific information about it, nor explain
the destiny of the collected funds.154
The second GFC is a United Kingdom-based campaign called
“Day in Court” (DIC), which, although not formally launched
through a CFP, the European online forum, Innovating Justice, recog-
nized it as an innovative idea.155 DIC’s promoters also focused on fa-
cilitating access to justice and indicated that their “website will allow
potential litigants to explain their ‘story’ to the public, who would
then have the opportunity to make micro-contributions to the cost of
raising an action (or reaching a settlement).”156 The project descrip-
tion does not indicate a specific goal or whether the campaign would
be reward-based, suggesting it may be a donation-based only
crowdfunding campaign.
Other new players emerging more recently in the CLF sub-indus-
try are a U.S.-based CFP, exclusively dedicated to litigation called Lex-
shares,157 and a Switzerland-based peer-to-peer litigation
crowdfunding network called Invest4Justice (I4J).158 Lexshares con-
sists of an online platform where accredited investors registered with
the website are given the opportunity to participate—as funders—in
any of the pre-screened litigations submitted by plaintiffs.159 The pool
of investors is limited to U.S. citizens with a net worth of more than
one million dollars or a gross annual income of at least $200,000, and
to foreign nationals whose applicable laws allow it.160 After a selective
process, Lexshares connects these accredited investors with private
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. JustAccess (Campaign Cancelled): Changing Directions, CSI CATALYST http://
www.csicatalyst.org/projects/28-justaccess#updates (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
155. Wildcard Nominee—Crowd Funding Legal Action, supra note 133.
156. Id.
157. See LEXSHARES, supra note 131.
158. INVEST4JUSTICE, supra note 131.
159. See LEXSHARES, supra note 131.
160. Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, INVESTOR.GOV (Sept. 23, 2013), http://
www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-bulletins/investor-bulletin-accredited-investors;
Terms of Use, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/terms_of_use (last visited Mar.
18, 2015).
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venture capital funds, especially established for investing in each legal
claim.161
In addition to evaluating the cases for eventual posting on the
website and taking the necessary steps to set up venture capital funds
dedicated to each litigation, Lexshares establishes the terms of the
funding agreement, posts the cases so interested investors are able to
make funding commitments, monitors the progress of the case, and
ensures that investors are paid from the proceeds of any recovery ob-
tained.162 The technology utilized by Lexshares also allows plaintiffs to
decide which investors have access to information about their case, to
monitor the progress of the fundraising campaign, and to retain con-
trol over litigation decisions.163 By screening and selecting who partic-
ipates both as plaintiff (funded party) and investor (funder), by
evaluating and selecting the pool of cases to be funded, by establish-
ing the terms of the funding agreement, and by monitoring the devel-
opment of the case, Lexshares plays a role that goes well beyond that
of mere matchmaker. As of March 2015, Lexshares’s portfolio com-
prised merely a handful of cases, only two of which have received com-
plete funding ($250,000 and $110,000, respectively),164 so at this point
it is not possible to determine how successful Lexshares is or will be.
The other new player is Invest4Justice (I4J), which also operates
through an online platform, but with a much broader reach than Lex-
shares.165 One differentiating feature between I4J and Lexshares is
that, in addition to supporting for-profit investment, I4J allows
funders to simply donate to a cause or litigation without any expecta-
tion of a financial gain (i.e., non-for-profit).166 Moreover, I4J does not
appear to get involved in screening each case, in certifying the inves-
tors, establishing the terms of funding, or regulating the issuers.167 To
the contrary, I4J’s main function seems to simply serve as a platform
that allows litigants, lawyers, prospective funders, law firms, and third-
party funders to interact with each other freely.168 In this sense, I4J
161. How It Works, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/how_it_works (last
visited Mar. 18, 2015).
162. See id.; Terms of Use, LEXSHARES, supra note 160.
163. See How It Works, LEXSHARES, supra note 161; Jonathan Shieber, Crowdfund Your
Next Lawsuit with Lexshares, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 19, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/
11/19/crowdfund-your-next-lawsuit-with-lexshares/.
164. Cases, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/cases (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
165. INVEST4JUSTICE, supra note 131.
166. Frequently Asked Questions, INVEST4JUSTICE, https://www.invest4justice.com/faq/
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
167. See id.
168. See id.
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operates more as a virtual marketplace than anything else. According
to its website, the only revenue obtained by I4J is a one-time fee
equivalent to four percent of the funds obtained if, and when, the
goal is reached.169 As a way to stress its non-for-profit goal, I4J also
vows to reinvest any profits in “worthy cases.”170
C. The Perceived Advantages of CLF over the Traditional ALF
Model
These examples show that the CLF sub-industry is expanding rap-
idly both in terms of the arrival of new players, and also regarding
funding strategies and safeguards against potential risks.171 Up until
now, CLF appears to have addressed two of the most common
problems generally attributed to ALF. The first problem refers to the
encouragement of potentially frivolous or meritless claims by outside
funders.172 The second is the possibility that outside funders attain
and exercise undue control over the litigation and the funded
party.173
Regarding the potential use of outside funding to facilitate the
filing of frivolous and meritless lawsuits, such risk seems unlikely in
the case of CLF. A frivolous claim “is one that relies on factual allega-
tions or legal theories so outlandish as to be inarguably insuffi-
cient.”174 A meritless claim, on the other hand, “is a claim in which a
court determines, after adversarial briefing or discovery, that a plain-
tiff’s theory of relief is insufficient or that a reasonable jury could not
find facts that would allow a plaintiff to recover.”175
The general reaction to frivolous litigation is one of scorn and
disapproval.176 Frivolous claims are seen as a waste of judicial re-
sources, a cause of delay and court congestion, and as an abuse of
one’s right to seek judicial protection.177 There is a general sense that
a lawyer who knowingly files a frivolous or a meritless claim should be
subject to sanctions, and that litigants should be discouraged or
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra Part III.B.
172. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1202–04 (2014) (discussing frivolous and meritless claims).
173. See Richmond, supra note 94, at 669–74; Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1321–25.
174. Reinert, supra note 172, at 1202.
175. Id. at 1203.
176. Id. at 1194.
177. Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 641–42 (2010).
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barred from manipulating the court system in such a manner.178 Crit-
ics of ALF have generally accused the industry of lending financial
resources to encourage otherwise illegitimate lawsuits. The main ex-
planation offered is that “by increasing the amount of money available
to pay attorneys to litigate claims, third-party funding necessarily in-
creases the volume of claims litigated.”179 This critique assumes that
the funder is primarily interested in obtaining a financial gain, regard-
less of whether the claim can be legally substantiated, or, in other
words, whether it has merit.
As a result, and despite knowing that a potential claim is without
substance, a third-party funder might still be incentivized to lend his
financial support. An unfounded lawsuit might be used strategically to
force a risk-averse defendant into a settlement; it might also be uti-
lized to shift the power balance between the parties, to give leverage
to the plaintiff and/or the funder, or simply to inflict harm.180 This is
only possible when the third-party funder is able to exercise influence
or control over the case or the plaintiff, an unlikely scenario in the
case of CLF, given that the funding generally comes from multiple
sources, thus impeding a single individual’s ability to attain the neces-
sary leverage to use the litigation as a strategic tool.
This characteristic of CLF also helps address the control problem.
At least in the case of CSC campaigns, the fact that the backing does
not come from a single individual, but from a crowd, has the potential
to mitigate some of the concerns associated with funder control and
other conflicts that commonly arise when the outside funder is a sin-
gle individual or small pool of individuals. As described previously,
crowdfunding campaigns not only tend to elicit contributions or do-
nations from a large number of individuals who are geographically
dispersed, but also tend to be composed of donations that are rela-
tively small as compared to other forms of outside financing.181 As a
result, most crowdfunding contributions are treated as donations
rather than investments, and are thus excluded from the legal regime
applicable to securities.182 What results from this is that no single do-
nor or funder, or even a group of them is likely to attain control over
the litigation or the funded party in the same way that a single funder
178. See Reinert, supra note 172, at 1195–1200.
179. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 5.
180. See Reinert, supra note 172, at 1216–17.
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. Crowdfunding, CUTTING EDGE CAPITAL, http://www.cuttingedgecapital.com/
crowdfunding/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
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might in the realm of traditional ALF. This is not to say that the risk of
outside funder control is nonexistent in CLF, but simply that the odds
are slim at best.
Moreover, the backers in a CSC are also able to obtain all the
necessary data from the promoter to make an informed decision
before investing. The fact that most CSC campaigns are launched
through well-known CFPs, and therefore are subject to screening re-
garding the scope, goals, and other relevant features of the campaign,
provides assurances to the potential backers and enhances the cam-
paign’s credibility.183 CFPs also play a role in diminishing the possibil-
ity of frivolous litigation. In this sense, CFPs become quality control
mechanisms, not just intermediaries. Furthermore, the emergence of
CLF-dedicated platforms such as Lexshares, which has its activities
subject to securities regulations, has also created a heightened screen-
ing process for lawsuits and funders, which, in turn, has meant more
safeguards for CLF users.
The fact that CLF has the potential to minimize some of the per-
ceived inefficiencies of ALF does not mean that this nascent sub-in-
dustry is without risks. One such problem may be found in the use of
GFCs, which instead of seeking funding directly for a specific cause,
intend to create yet another intermediary that will, in turn, disburse
the funds among cases chosen by the promoters.184 While the idea of
facilitating access to justice is likely appealing to the average citizen, a
potential contributor might want to know more about the specific
purpose of the funds instead of leaving that decision to the promoters
alone. Further, given the nature and various levels of success of the
CLF campaigns launched to this date through traditional CFPs,185 it
seems that the backers are content with the role played by Indiegogo
and others, and may not be particularly keen on supporting the idea
of another layer of brokerage between the promoter and the funder.
We can also see that with the exception of the SOP campaign,
which as of March 2015, has raised almost half million dollars, most
CLF campaigns have merely raised between three to ten thousand dol-
lars.186 This might mean that promoters may also have to rely on
other contributions, such as pro bono representation by the lawyers
involved in the litigation because crowdfunding contributions are in-
183. See Natasha Lomas, Tackling the Crowdfunding Credibility Gap: A Q&A with Drop-
kicker, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/30/dropkicker/.
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. See supra Table 1.
186. See supra Table 1.
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sufficient to cover all litigation-related expenses.187 It is important to
note, however, that the relatively low amounts raised in the aforemen-
tioned CSCs do not necessarily mean that CLF will only work for low-
budget litigation. As seen from the cases recently funded through Lex-
shares, CLF has been used to raise monies in the order of six figures, a
clear signal of the promise of this emerging sector.188
The general crowdfunding industry began with relatively low
threshold campaigns that quickly evolved into a multi-million dollar
sector,189 where, for example, a single campaign initially set at five
hundred thousand dollars in 2012,190 raised more than fifty million
dollars by August 2014.191 By the same token, it is possible that the
CLF sector evolves into an important segment where top dollar dis-
putes also receive support, or where a large number of backers con-
tribute toward an ambitious goal. Even so, it is likely that most
disputes that receive support through traditional CFPs will be non-
commercial, as the promoters would not able to offer the backers the
same incentives that an outside investor could obtain in the tradi-
tional context of third-party funding described in Part II.192
Conclusion
Crowd-litigation funding is in its infancy, but has incredible po-
tential for growth in a similar manner to the development of the gen-
eral crowdfunding industry a few years ago. Although the number of
cases involving CLF is still small, it is likely that the numbers will in-
crease, thus creating more opportunities for litigants to obtain the
support they need to pursue their claims in court or to defend them-
selves in litigation. In this sense, CLF has the potential to level the
187. See MANUEL A. GO´MEZ & JUAN C. GO´MEZ, GENERAL REPORT ON RELIEF IN SMALL AND
SIMPLE MATTERS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5–11 (Nov. 2014) (report prepared for
the International Association of Procedural Law World Congress). The average cost of
litigation varies greatly depending on different factors such as the type of parties, type of
case, and length of litigation, among others. Nevertheless, according to a survey conducted
by the National Center for State Courts in 2013, the average cost of a fully litigated case in
the United States ranges from $54,000 to $122,000. See id. at 8–9.
188. See Cases, LEXSHARES, supra note 164.
189. See Freedman & Nutting, supra note 16, at 1–3.
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(last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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playing field and benefit otherwise disenfranchised litigants, and in
more general terms, facilitate access to justice.
Even though this outlook is promising, CLF also runs the risk of
enabling actors with less noble goals to take advantage of well-inten-
tioned donors, and even to manipulate the system to their advantage.
The possibilities range from promoters that fail to fulfill their
promises offered through a crowdfunding campaign, to the utilization
of crowdfunding to promote frivolous litigation, to the use of a
“fabricated crowd” to disguise the identity of a real funder who does
not want to be identified. Some of these problems have arisen in simi-
lar contexts and were resolved through litigation193 or were averted by
the CFPs themselves by imposing certain obligations on those who
promote their campaigns through the platforms.194
Whereas these resolutions show the crowdfunding industry’s abil-
ity to regulate itself and tackle novel challenges as they appear, there
may be other areas that remain exposed to risk, perhaps in need of
other forms of social control through policymaking and regulation.
Only time will tell. Meanwhile, the CLF industry appears as a wel-
comed occurrence that has the potential to empower the crowds to
help realize the goals of justice.
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